In 1996, the Congregation Etz Chaim applied to the City of Los Angeles for a conditional use permit to operate a house of prayer on the residentially zoned Highland property. The application was denied, however, the Congregation and the City entered into a settlement agreement allowing the use conditioned on a number of restrictions. Prior to the settlement, the Congregation filed a complaint alleging that the City’s actions violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), on which a motion for summary judgment was denied as there still remained triable issues of fact. Several homeowners, however, were not happy with the settlement and filed a separate suit against both parties, seeking a declaration that the settlement agreement was invalid because it did not conform to applicable zoning laws. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the homeowners and declared the settlement agreement invalid and unenforceable, holding that “a municipality cannot waive or consent to a violation of its zoning laws” unless the settlement agreement was required to remedy an actual violation of federal law. The court sent the case back to the lower court for a decision on this issue. Meanwhile, Mr. and Mrs. Younis filed an action in the Superior Court, claiming that the Congregation’s use constituted a public and private nuisance. Their motion for preliminary injunction to enjoin the Congregation from conducting religious services was granted on in May, 2008 and the claim was scheduled for trial. Prior to trial, the Congregation filed a new application for a CUP with the city.
The District Court issued an Order to Show Cause regarding dismissal. The Congregation argued the RLUIPA action should be reinstated, however, the Younises and the City argued that the action should be dismissed as the current controversy was not ripe and issue preclusion barred the Congregation’s claim. The court agreed with City and Younises holding that the case was not ripe for review until the city of Los Angeles took final action on the Congregation’s second conditional use permit application. The court reasoned that the Congregation was not in immediate jeopardy because the City had not taken any action to enforce the original denial of the conditional use permit and the second application presented the first opportunity for the City to consider the Congregation’s request in light of RLUIPA. Additionally, although there was an action in which a permanent injunction could result, only a preliminary injunction had been issued. The court dismissed the action without prejudice, permitting the Congregation to refile RLUIPA claim if the City denies the Congregation’s second conditional use application, or upon a more definite showing of hardship to the Congregation.
Congregation Etz Chaim v. City of Los Angeles, 2009 WL 1293257 (5/5/2009 C.D. Cal.)
UPDATE: May 2011
United States Files Brief Supporting Los Angeles Synagogue in Long-Running RLUIPA Dispute
On April 28, the United States filed a Statement of Interest in Congregation Etz Chaim v. City of Los Angeles, arguing that city violated RLUIPA by denying zoning approval for a small Jewish congregation to gather in a home in a residential neighborhood. The United States’ brief argues that the city has imposed a substantial burden on the congregation’s religious exercise, and that it has treated the congregation less favorably than non-religious assemblies in the same neighborhood.
As detailed in Volume 44 of Religious Freedom in Focus, this case involves the longstanding efforts of a small Hassidic Jewish congregation to gather for worship in a house in Los Angeles’ Hancock Park neighborhood. The United States’ Statement of Interest supports the congregation’s argument that it is entitled to summary judgment—that is, that based on the undisputed facts in the case, it has shown that it is entitled to relief under RLUIPA and thus a trial is unnecessary.
The United States’ brief contends that the city has violated RLUIPA section 2(a), which protects against “substantial burdens” on religious exercise through zoning. The brief notes that this provision requires a review of all of the surrounding facts, including the history of a congregation’s efforts to locate a place of worship. Where there are “no ready alternatives” or where alternatives would require “substantial delay, uncertainty and expense,” a substantial burden may be found. Here, the Congregation has shown that its members needed to be able to walk to worship. Many of the congregants, who had moved to the neighborhood to be within walking distance of the congregation, would be physically unable to walk farther to another location outside of the neighborhood. Also relevant is the fact that the congregation belongs to a unique Chassidic sect of Judaism, and their rabbit is the only Witznitzer Rebbe in the United States. The brief concludes that the congregation has established that its religious exercise was substantially burdened. Under RLUIPA, a municipality can only impose such a burden if it has a compelling reason for doing so, which, the United States argues, the city has not shown.
The United States’ brief also argues that the congregation has demonstrated that it has not been treated equally with nonreligious assemblies in the Hancock Park neighborhood, in violation of RLUIPA Section 2(b)(1). Section 2(b)(1) provides that “No government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner that treats a religious assembly or institution on less than equal terms with a nonreligious assembly or institution.” This was intended to address the numerous instances Congress identified of cities barring churches in places where nonreligious assemblies with similar impacts on the communities are allowed. As the Joint Statement of RLUIPA sponsors Senators Hatch and Senator Kennedy stated, “zoning codes frequently exclude churches in places where they permit theaters, meeting halls, and other places where large groups of people assemble for secular purposes.”
The United States’ brief notes that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which covers California, has not yet laid out the standard for determining what constitutes unequal treatment of religious and nonreligious assemblies under RLUIPA. Other courts, however, have used different approaches. Under any of these approaches, the brief argues, the congregation has not been treated equally. The zoning code on its face allows “community centers” in the district. Moreover, the city has allowed various secular assemblies to locate in Hancock Park. For example, the Los Angeles Tennis Club, in addition to sporting activities, hosts regular social gatherings for members and “a full slate of holiday parties throughout the year” including a Fourth of July gala, and events featuring opportunities for children “to meet Santa and the Easter Bunny.” The brief concludes that permitting such assemblies to operate but not the congregation constitutes unequal treatment in violation of RLUIPA Section 2(b)(1).
A decision by the court is expected in the next several weeks.
