A daycare center was opened in an area zoned for office parks that allowed accessory child care facilities in order to provide care for the children of employees of the office park. Later, the permitted use was expanded by variance to allow attendance by children of parents that did not work in the office park. A second daycare center was opened, again within the permitted use, for the provision of services to workers in the office park. Likewise, this use was expanded by variance to allow children of outside families to be cared for at this facility. The second daycare operation differed from the first in that it was run by a Catholic organization, whereas the first had no religious affiliation.
Several years after the second daycare center opened the first changed locations, leaving its premises vacant. The Montessori Center wanted to take over the premises in order to start a K-3 primary school. Upon application to the zoning administrator, permission to use the premises in this capacity was denied due to the township’s zoning ordinances, which prohibited primary schools in areas zoned for office parks. The Center then sought a reversal of the zoning administrator’s decision, a variance to allow the use, or a designation that the use of the premises as a K-3 facility was a “substituted use” of the premises from the use by the first daycare program. At the ZBA hearing, although the religious nature of the program was offered as an additional reason that the use should be permitted, the ZBA denied the requests.
As a result of the denial, the Center brought suit against the Township alleging a violation of equal protection rights, as well as a claim under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) that the denial of permits needed to effectuate the planned school impermissibly interfered with and placed a substantial burden on religious exercise. The trial court granted summary judgment to the Township. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the claims were valid and remanded the claims to the trial court for full proceedings. The Township applied to the Michigan Supreme Court and was denied a hearing.
A second set of motions for summary judgment was filed and the trial court again found in favor of the Township. Plaintiff appealed and the Appellate division reversed the trial court’s finding and ordered the trial court to enter a judgment reversing the ZBA’s denial of the variance. Upon this ruling, the Township applied to be heard in Michigan Supreme Court, an application which was granted. The Michigan Supreme Court ordered the Court of Appeals to rule in accordance with its precedent. Applying the precedent forced the Court of Appeals into agreement with the trial court’s decision on the RILUPA claim, but did not convince it that the trial court had been correct to also dismiss the constitutional claims. The trial court was again ordered by the Court of Appeals to find in favor of the plaintiff on the equal protection issue.
Eventually, the Michigan Supreme Court was tasked with determining whether the denial of the variance to the Center violated the coextensive equal protection clauses of the Michigan and United States Constitutions. The Michigan Supreme Court noted that in its analysis of the denial of the variance it needed to determine whether the Center had been treated differently than other similarly situated entities, or if the Center could be included in any suspect or quasi-suspect classes that would entitle it to different or preferential treatment.
Finding that a classification as a religious entity did not warrant any special protections the court determined that a simple rational basis review would apply to the Center’s equal protection claims. The court determined that the two daycare centers, the secular and the religious had been treated in exactly the same manner; both were allowed to operate daycare facilities, as these facilities were permitted by the zoning ordinance. Both entities were also allowed to expand the clientele served by their businesses beyond that permitted by the zoning ordinance, via variance. In obtaining these variances, neither daycare facility had attempted to change the nature or scope of its business.
The denial of the variance at issue was one that would change the nature of the business from one that was permitted by the zoning ordinance to one that was not permitted by the zoning ordinance. Since no other business had ever applied for and been granted a variance for a business not otherwise permitted in that area the Center’s claim of disparate treatment could not be sustained. The Court explained, “The township’s consideration of different requests does not constitute different treatment of similarly situated entities.” The court continued by noting that the Center was seeking preferential treatment, not equal treatment and that the Township had not barred the Center from operating a primary school, rather that it had forbidden one when it was precluded by the zoning ordinance. Because the Center could not pass the threshold test demonstrating disparate treatment of similarly situated entities the court did not need to address whether the zoning ordinance was rationally related to a legitimate interest of the Township.
The Center also alleged that it had faced discrimination on the basis of being a religious entity. That is, it claimed that the facially neutral zoning ordinance had been administered in a discriminatory manner. In order to prove this allegation, the Center had to prove disproportionate impact and discriminatory intent. The Center claimed that questioning regarding the religious nature of the proposed school by the ZBA demonstrated the ill will of the ZBA towards the Center. However, the issue of religion was initially introduced as a reason for special treatment by the plaintiff and that the questioning followed from this introduction. For this reason the Michigan Supreme Court rejected the allegation of discriminatory intent by the ZBA. Further, ZBA minutes and documentation did not contain anything that suggested that the decision was influenced by the knowledge of religious affiliation.
It was also noted that the ordinance was generally applicable and uniformly applied, and that no other schools had ever been permitted in an area of the same zoning as the premises proposed by the center. Further, it was noted that the religious practice was merely incidentally affected, since it was not prohibiting the establishment of a religious school, but rather was controlling where the school could be located.
Shepherd Montessori Center Milan v. Ann Arbor Charter Township, 2010 WL 2471899 (Mich. 6/18/2010).
The opinion can be accessed at: http://courts.michigan.gov/supremecourt/clerk/12-09/137443/137443-Opinion.pdf
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