Great Lakes Society (GLS), a religious organization that ministers to people with chemical sensitivities, initiated this case after the township denied its application to construct a 9,700 square foot building on a six-acre parcel of property located in a low-density residential district. Although the zoning ordinance allowed churches in residential zones as a special use, the township concluded that GLS’s building was not “for public worship” and thus was not eligible for a special permit.
While GLS’s special permit request was pending, the township amended the zoning ordinance’s street-frontage requirements, and because GLS’s property did not meet the new requirements, it applied for a variance. The zoning boad of appeals denied the variance, and then GLS appealed this denial as well as the denial of its special use permit application. It asserted claims under RLUIPA and under the state and federal constitutions. The trial court reject GLS’s nondiscrimination RLUIPA claim, as it concluded that religious animus played no part in the board’s decision. It similarly rejected the equal terms and unreasonable exclusion RLUIPA claims, finding no support for them in the record. (GLS’s substantial burden RLUIPA claim and constitutional claims were addressed in a separate ruling, and were not at issue in this case.) GLS moved for reconsideration of its claims under RLUIPA’s equal terms, nondiscrimination, and unreasonable limitation provisions, but leave was denied by the trial court. GLS then appealed the decision in favor of the township, as well as the denial of its motion for reconsideration.
The township first asserted that GLS’s RLUIPA claims for injunctive relief and damages were rendered moot by the court’s previous affirmance of the variance denial. The court declined to decide this issue, however, explaining that it was not properly preserved, and that it was unclear whether the statute even provided for damages as an available remedy.
On the merits, the court affirmed the grant of summary disposition in favor of the township. Although GLS argued that the court considered evidence of discrimination in its prior interlocutory appeal that was not considered by the trial court, the court pointed out that “to the extent that we considered this evidence…, we did not hold that defendants’ conduct was discriminatory in denying plaintiff’s application for a SUP or variance or in amending the zoning ordinance…. To the contrary, our reasoning and holdings regarding plaintiff’s constitutional claims indicate our rejection of the notion that defendants’ conduct was discriminatory.”
Regarding GLS’s equal terms claim, the court explained that the frontage requirement could not be considered to treat churches on less than equal terms than commercial uses that were not permitted at all in residential zones. Moreover, “none of the evidence cited in plaintiff’s brief establishes an issue of fact regarding whether defendant treated plaintiff less favorably in processing, determining and deciding plaintiff’s application for a SUP than a similarly situated non-religious assembly or institution.”
The court similarly rejected GLS’s appeal of the nondiscrimination determination, explaining that GLS failed to show “how the fact that certain individuals may have made negative or hostile comments about plaintiff’s proposed church translates into discrimination on the part of defendants.” Most of GLS’s evidence related to the township’s concerns regarding the size of the church and the number of congregants, which, according to the court, did not show discrimination but rather appropriate concern with the question of whether the proposed facility would qualify as a church under the zoning ordinance. Nor did GLS provide any evidence that the township discriminated against religious uses generally or against its religious denomination.
Regarding GLS’s claim that the township unreasonably limited religious uses, the court concluded that “beyond generally referring to the evidence that it alleges the trial court improperly refused to consider, and citing Rocky Mt Christian Church, 613 F3d 1229, for the proposition that a land use regulation can be unreasonable even if does not totally exclude religious assembly, plaintiff does not assert how defendants’ conduct was unreasonable.” To the extent that the court’s previous opinion considered evidence not considered by the trial court, the court reiterated that it did not find that evidence to show any unreasonable or discriminatory conduct.
GLS also argued that the trial court overlooked its nondiscrimination claim or conflated it with the equal terms claim. The court rejected this argument, noting that nothing in the trial court’s statements suggested any confusion on its part at the time it granted the township’s motion for summary disposition. Any confusion that existed, the court also noted, could have been caused by the incorrect numbering in GLS’s complaint, and any such error caused by GLS could not support a reversal. Moreover, “Even assuming that the trial court was confused at the time of the summary disposition motion, which it clearly was not, any error in this regard is harmless given our holding that plaintiff failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding its ‘nondiscrimination’ claim.”
Regarding the denial of GLS’s motion for reconsideration, the court first emphasized that the motion was filed two years and four months after the decision, even though the statute limited such motions to a time period of 21 days. GLS claimed that it was entitled to an exception because the trial court failed to adjudicate all of its claims, but the court explained that the statute only gave trial courts discretionary authority to revisit their prior rulings and did not mandate or require reconsideration.
Great Lakes Society v. Georgetown Charter Twp., 2011 WL 1600496 (Mich. App. Apr. 28, 2011)
The opinion can be accessed at: http://coa.courts.mi.gov/documents/OPINIONS/FINAL/COA/20110428_C296370_49_296370.OPN.PDF
