Plaintiffs, Chabad Lubavitch of Litchfield County, Inc. (a religious corporation), (hereinafter “the Chabad”) and Rabbi Joseph Eisenbach (who formed the Chabad corporation), brought an action in federal court in the District of Connecticut against the Borough of Litchfield (hereinafter “the Borough”), the Historic District Commission of the Borough (hereinafter “the HDC”) and other individual defendants seeking declaratory relief and damages under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA).
The Chabad purchased a building in the Borough located in a historic district. The Chabad, who wished to expand its facilities to accommodate an increasing number of members, needed to modify the building to do so and thus filed a Certificate of Appropriateness with the HDC. The HDC denied the Certificate, stating they couldn’t allow construction of an addition that was bigger than the original, and the current claim ensued.
The court found that Rabbi Eisenbach lacked standing because he did not have a sufficient property interest to satisfy RLUIPA’s requirements, and lacked any interest independent of the Chabad that gave him standing for any of plaintiffs’ other claims. The court found that he was merely a member of the organization, and the fact that he may use the property is not enough to bring a RLUIPA action. They emphasized that “a construction of ‘property interest’ to extend to a creditor of a corporation is so clearly incongruous with the language and purposes of RLUIPA, it barely warrants addressing.” The court dismissed the Rabbi’s individual claims, noting they were derivative of the Chabad’s claims, and focused primarily on the latter.
Plaintiff’s claimed that when defendants’ refused to allow the proposed modifications, it “substantially burdened” the exercise of religion, in violation of RLUIPA. They further alleged that the Chabad was treated differently than similarly situated organizations, and that defendants violated plaintiff’s free speech, freedom of association, and due process rights. Defendants responded to plaintiff’s allegations by arguing that RLUIPA is facially unconstitutional, which the court quickly dismissed, noting Second Circuit precedent that RLUIPA was constitutional under the Commerce Clause. The Court explained that because plaintiff’s claims arise from the defendants’ refusal to allow building construction, and the Second Circuit expressly included “commercial building construction” as affecting interstate commerce, RLUPIA’s application to the case was constitutional under Commerce Clause authority.
Defendants then attempted to challenge the constitutionality of the “equal terms” provision of RLUIPA, albeit unsuccessfully, by arguing that it violated the Establishment Clause. The court explained the three-prong analysis used to resolve Establishment Clause claims – that the government’s interaction with religion must (1) have a secular purpose, (2) have a principal effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and (3) not bring about excessive government entanglement with religion. They found that the equal terms provision of RLUIPA satisfied that test. The equal terms provision targets unequal treatment of religious organizations, a valid secular purpose; it does not advance religion simply because it allows for the advancement of religion; and it does not result in excessive entanglement between church and state, indeed, it actually maintains their separation.
As to the remainder of plaintiff’s claims, the court found that Chabad’s pleadings sufficiently alleged a substantial burden under RLUIPA, different treatment, and freedom of speech/association/due process violations. “Substantial burden” is defined as a “government action that directly coerces the religious institution to change its behavior,” and here, the Chabad purchased property with the intent to construct a space large enough to accommodate their religious practices, but were denied the opportunity to do so by the HDC. If the Chabad adhered the the HDC’s specification they would have to sacrifice a large portion of the space they believe to be necessary. The Chabad’s claim that they were treated differently than similarly situated organizations rested on facts that showed other buildings in the historic district were allowed to construct additions that were larger than the original building and therefore sufficiently pled a claim for relief. Finally, with respect to defendants’ violation of plaintiff’s free speech, freedom of association, and due process rights, the court found that the HDC acted with the intent to interfere with Chabad’s religious speech and association. The court denied defendants’ motion for judgment on these pleadings, along with the due process claim, because defendant failed to address their arguments to the claims Chabad actually brought, instead addressing unrelated case law and making conclusory allegations.
As a result of the foregoing, the court found plaintiff’s remaining complaints were sufficiently plausible to maintain causes of action against defendants and therefore denied defendants’ motions to dismiss, except for those of Rabbi Eisenbach, who was removed as a party to the action for lack of standing.
Lubavitch v. Borough of Litchfield, Conn., 3:09-CV-1419 JCH, 2011 WL 2471276 (D. Conn. 6/21/ 2011)
The ruling can be accessed at: http://www.scribd.com/doc/58426124/Chabad-v-Litchfield-6-11
