Frank Griswold originally brought suit in response to the Homer Advisory Planning Commission’s grant of a conditional use permit to the Kachemak Shellfish Mariculture Association (hereinafter “KSMA”). Griswold claimed in his complaint that the permit should be denied because it would interfere with his enjoyment of the public beach that he walked and trained his dogs on. He also claimed that the building that would be constructed by KSMA would jeopardize future theater productions at a theater across the street that he occasionally liked to attend. Finally, Griswold claimed that he drove past the site where KSMA wished to build on a daily basis and that he was concerned for the safety of pedestrians, including KSMA clients, who would have to cross the highway due to the lack of sufficient parking on the KSMA site. The city clerk for the city of Homer rejected Griswold’s complaint due to his lack of standing. Griswold appealed the city clerk’s decision to the superior court which affirmed and awarded the city as well as KSMA attorney’s fees. Griswold then appealed to the Supreme Court of Alaska, who affirmed the two lower court’s decisions.
The city clerk rejected Griswold’s appeal of the Homer Advisory Planning Commission’s grant of a permit because it lacked standing since Griswold did not mention or prove that he owned real property in the vicinity of 3851 Homer Spit Road. The city clerk further stated that Griswold had no interest in the property that the general public did not also have, and therefore was not an “aggrieved person” according to the Homer City Code. Homer City Code 21.68.030(c) states that for a person to be aggrieved “the person must show proof of the adverse effect the action or determination has or could have on the use, enjoyment, or value of real property owned by that person.” According to the city clerk, superior court, and Supreme Court of Alaska, Griswold did not meet the definition of an aggrieved person according to the Homer City Code. All three court levels came to the same conclusion because Homer did not own any real property near the site KSMA had obtained a permit to build on. Therefore, Griswold’s complaint against the issuance of the building permit was nothing more than a generalized grievance, which lacks standing.
On appeal to the higher courts Griswold argued that the provisions of the Homer City Code that limit standing unlawfully eliminate taxpayer-citizen standing in land use cases. In response to that argument the Supreme Court of Alaska concluded that “in the area of land use law, the legislature has chosen to limit standing by statute.” Griswold also argued that the Homer City Code violated his due process rights. Griswold based this argument on the Homer City Code requirement that a person must participate in proceedings before the planning commission in order to have standing on an appeal. However, Griswold did in fact voice his objections in front of the planning commission before the permit was issued. The courts noted that Griswold’s due process rights were not violated since he did make an appearance in front of the board, and that Griswold could not assert due process rights of others who did not participate in the planning commission’s hearings. The court also concluded that Griswold was not deprived of a property interest sufficient to warrant constitutional protection because he did not have a protected property interest since he did not own any real property near the subject site.
Griswold v. City of Homer, 2011 WL 2274553 (Alaska 6/10/2011).
The opinion can be accessed at: http://www.courts.alaska.gov/ops/sp-6565.pdf
