The plaintiffs, a realty company and property owners, filed an application with the planning board for a major land development project. The board reviewed the plaintiff’s application along with the issue of stone mounds found on the property and whether they contained the remains of American Indians. Shortly thereafter, the chairperson of the conservation commission e-mailed the chairperson of the advisory commission on historical cemeteries regarding the issue of possible American Indian remains. Months later the town council held a meeting in which Doctor Meli was presented who had studied the land and he “thought” that it contained American Indian remains. The town council then approved a motion which requested the process of “defining and protecting the area begin” as well as a motion that referred the matter to the planning board with the recommendation that no further ground disturbing activity be permitted. The next month Doctor Meli was hired by the town council to conduct a study of a site next to the proposed development site.
As part of the planning board’s ongoing review process there were four meetings held. At one of the meetings a member of the advisory commission provided the board with a letter they had sent to the conservation commission stating they had been informed “of the two (2) new cemeteries which had been registered,” although it lacks the authority to do so. Doctor Meli also testified he was 95% certain the stone mounds were burial mounds and dismissed the report submitted by the Public Archaeological Laboratory (PAL) which concluded that the stone mounds were not burial sites, stating it was “‘at best cursory.’” At the conclusion of these meetings the planning board voted to deny plaintiff’s application for development.
After a year-long procedural battle the plaintiffs appealed from the final judgment of the trial court which granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss only to have the supreme court affirm the decision. On appeal plaintiffs argued three things: 1) that the trial justice should not have dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint since the advisory commission violated plaintiffs’ procedural due process rights according to the state constitution; 2) that its substantive due process rights were violated because the advisory commission’s actions were “arbitrary and unreasonable;” and 3) that the trial justice erred when he failed to recognize a slander of title claim against defendants.
As to plaintiffs’ first argument, although plaintiff does not dispute the advisory commission’s pure advisory capacity, they argue that their “constitutionally protected interest” was violated by not affording them “notice or an opportunity to be heard” before the property was inventoried. However, due to the pure advisory role of the advisory council, plaintiffs do not have any “protected liberty interest” in the commission’s actions.
Secondly it was held that plaintiffs’ procedural due process claim could not be asserted against the advisory commission since the commission’s actions did not stop plaintiffs from developing on the property nor did it have any other legal effect. The officials on the planning board were never bound to follow the advice of the advisory commission since they act independently.
Lastly, plaintiffs argued that the advisory commission maliciously uttered false statements concerning the property in correspondence to the head of the conservation commission which the town council and planning board also reviewed. The court held that while the plaintiffs did present competent evidence establishing a dispute over whether the commission made false statements and whether it had acted with malice, not only did the board not rely on this correspondence in making their decision, but the independent nature of the planning board constitutes a superseding cause, releasing any action of the commission from liability.
Narragansett Improvement Company v. Wheeler, 2011 WL 2528210 (R.I. 06/27/11)
This opinion can be accessed at: http://caselaw.findlaw.com/ri-supreme-court/1572597.html
