In 1994, Northridge Church petitioned the Township for special land-use exemptions to use property it had purchased for a church, along with related recreational and accessory purposes. The church-auditorium would have capacity for 4,000 people, and there would be a three-wing building complex developed in phases for recreational uses. The surrounding areas were single- or multiple-family use zones, and an expressway. To qualify for the changed zoning category, Northridge had to prove that the requested zoning uses were in harmony with, and would not be detrimental to, the appropriate and orderly development of the district and adjacent districts, would not cause traffic problems, were not objectionable to nearby uses or dwellings by fumes, lighting or safety hazards, and its use would not hinder adjacent development /existing uses. The Township denied the application on the basis that the proposed use was in conflict with the area in which it was situated and the adjacent areas, the vehicular circulation of the proposed use would not be in the best interest of the public health and safety and would conflict with the normal traffic of the planned unit, and the proposed use and structures were not compatible with the definition of “church” in the applicable ordinance. The church sued alleging the denial and zoning restrictions violated its rights under the First Amendment and (at the time the still valid) Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq. In 1995, two years before RFRA was invalidated by the U.S. Supreme Court, Northridge and the Township agreed to a consent judgment. This permitted the construction of a church on the land but with restrictions, including a building capacity of 3,500, and a cap on the number of parking spaces.
By 2008, the congregation had grown to over 14,000, and the restrictions meant that the church had to incur shuttle-bus costs, move services to weekdays, and otherwise limit its operations. It applied to modify or set aside the consent judgment under Rule 60(b), alleging it was void under RLUIPA, or inequitable. This was denied by the district court, and the Church appealed.
The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that “Northridge’s request strikes us as a plea for a ‘do over,’ and we decline the invitation.” The Court also rejected the Township’s argument that the Court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the consent-judgment challenge because the consent judgment did not affect rights protected by the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). It held the original complaint had alleged violations of federal laws, and a Rule 60(b) motion was considered a continuation of the original proceeding.
On the merits, however, the Court held that the consent judgment was not void. The fact that a consent judgment violated a federal statute, let alone a subsequently-enacted federal statute, did not render the judgment “void” under Rule 60(b)(4), noting that the Rule applied “only in the rare instance where a judgment [was] premised either on a certain type of jurisdictional error or on a violation of due process that deprive[d] a party of notice or the opportunity to be heard.”
With respect to the second claim, that changed legal and factual circumstances required modification of the consent judgment under Rule 60(b)(5), and that RLUIPA changed the legal landscape, the court noted that the Rule did not allow modification simply when it was no longer convenient to live with the terms of a consent decree, but only when there was a “significant change either in factual conditions or in law.” Here, in all relevant respects, the same test for First Amendment zoning challenges that existed at the time Northridge and Plymouth entered into the consent judgment applied now; more significantly, the RFRA claim was “the exact challenge that Northridge now makes under RLUIPA.” On the factual changes, Northridge’s desire to have all of its congregants worship together “did not suffice to permit Northridge to avoid the consequences of what we must take to be Northridge’s anticipated expansion,” and needing to conduct several services or activities to accommodate its members was not a substantial burden on a church. Likewise, the costs for the shuttle service constituted only three percent of the church’s annual budget. Here, “the changed factual landscape stems mostly from Northridge’s growth—something entirely within its own power. To allow a party to escape a consent judgment based on its own voluntary actions strikes us as unjustified.”
Northridge Church v. Charter Township of Plymouth, 2011 WL 3180566 (6th Cir. 7/28/2011).
The opinion can be accessed at:http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/11a0197p-06.pdf
This abstract is edited from IMLA E-News Aug. 3, 2011. For more information about IMLA, see: www.imla.org
