The appellate court held that the zoning board of appeals properly upheld a building permit issued by the building inspector after the board determined that the street in question had become a village street, and that the board’s decision was neither arbitrary nor capricious.

Sherwin v Village of Goshen Zoning Board of Appeals, 2016 WL 2890007 (NYAD 2 Dept. 5/28/2016).

In September 2002, Plaintiff John Macdonough purchased a skid steer and dump trailer and contacted Spaman, Code Enforcement Officer for the Town of Frankfort to see if he would be allowed to store this equipment on his property at 114 Hayes Road in Frankfort, New York (“Hayes property”). Spaman advised Plaintiff that since this equipment was agricultural in nature, it could be stored on the property in accordance with town zoning law as the Hayes property was within a Residence-Agriculture District. In June 2003, Plaintiff purchased an excavator and again contacted Spaman to determine if this additional piece of equipment could be stored on the Hayes property; Spaman told Plaintiff the storage of this equipment was also permitted use of the property. In March 2007, Plaintiff completed the purchase of property located at 2236 Albany Road in Frankfort, New York. Before closing on this property, Plaintiff contacted Spaman to determine if all of the aforementioned equipment could be stored on the property, and she said it could be stored there in compliance with town regulations.

Piazza sent an email to Joseph Kinney, Town Supervisor for the Town of Frankfort, requesting that Plaintiff be prosecuted for the Albany Road property’s alleged lack of compliance with local zoning law. Spaman served Plaintiff with a Notice and Order to Remedy, later calling Plaintiff to apologize because “she was ordered from ‘higher up’ to issue” the Notice, even though she believed he was in compliance with RA District zoning regulations. Plaintiff sought a special use permit from the Town’s Zoning Board of Appeals (“ZBA”), which was denied following a public hearing. In July 2012, Plaintiff filed an Article 78 Petition in Herkimer County Supreme Court challenging the ZBA’s denial of his special use permit application. The decision stated that as long as the equipment is agricultural equipment, there was no need for a special use permit, and as a result, Plaintiff’s application for a special use permit was unnecessary and therefore denied. After the court’s decision in the Article 78 proceeding, Defendants reinitiated criminal prosecution of Plaintiff for his alleged violation of zoning laws, and sought imprisonment, fines at the rate of $250 per day, and “serious legal repercussions.” Plaintiff was found not guilty, and the Town’s attorney sent a letter to Plaintiff threatening further legal action after the verdict was rendered. Plaintiff then brought this action, claiming malicious prosecution and a host of retaliation and due process claims.

At the outset, the court noted that since the Town of Frankfort was named as a Defendant in this action, all claims against Spaman and Kinney in their official capacities were dismissed as redundant of the claims asserted against the Town. However, the Court found that Plaintiff adequately alleged that Spaman was an official with final decision-making authority and that she could have caused or contributed to the constitutional violations. Here, Spaman identified herself as the head of a department with the final authority on determinations as to whether landowner’s use of property conformed with Town code and zoning law. The court therefore found that Plaintiff established liability on behalf of a municipality under § 1983.

As to the malicious prosecution claim, the court found that Plaintiff adequately pleaded a deprivation of liberty since he was required to appear no fewer than nine times for this matter. Moreover, the Second Circuit has held that the requirement that a defendant released on his own recognizance “render himself at all times amenable to the orders and processes of the court” is sufficient to implicate the Fourth Amendment. The court also denied the motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s class-of-one claim since there was no rational basis for the difference in treatment accorded to the comparator Leitz and Tomaino properties. Here, Plaintiff and Leitz used their property in a similar fashion from 2007 to 2009 without incident; in 2010 Defendants began citing Plaintiff for zoning violations, although they have never cited Leitz. Furthermore, the Tomaino property was also used similarly to Plaintiff’s property “for many years” without receiving a citation.

The court also found that Plaintiff’s selective enforcement, abuse of process, and First Amendment retaliation claims were adequately plead, since it was plausible that Defendants’ decision to resume criminal proceedings against Plaintiff following his victory in the Article 78 proceeding was motivated by retaliatory animus. Conversely, Plaintiff’s substantive due process claim was denied, as Plaintiff failed to establish a “clear entitlement” to maintain excavation equipment on the Albany Road property. Here, the Frankfort Town Code § 88-8 provides uses as of right and special uses that are permitted “in the discretion of the Board of Appeals.” Lastly, the court rejected Defendants’ qualified immunity defense because the court could not find as a matter of law that a reasonable official in Defendant Spaman’s position would not have understood that it would be wrong to irrationally treat the Plaintiff and his property differently than the other owners and properties related to this case.

Macdonough v Spaman, 2016 WL 1298134 (NDNY 3/31/2016)

In 2009, the County of Kern enacted an ordinance effectively authorizing medical marijuana dispensaries in commercially zoned areas, which include the defendants’ location in Rosamond, California. In 2011, the County approved a new ordinance banning medical marijuana dispensaries throughout the County’s jurisdiction. The new ordinance would have repealed and replaced the 2009 ordinance if it had become effective. However, the new ordinance banning dispensaries did not become effective because it was suspended by operation of section 9144 when County received a valid protest petition from its voters. County’s board of supervisors responded in 2012 to the protest petition by presenting County voters with an alternate ordinance called referendum Measure G, which authorized dispensaries to operate in industrial zones and subjected them to several restrictions. After the election, some dispensaries located in commercially zoned areas filed an action challenging the validity of Measure G, alleging the environmental review required by the California Environmental Quality Act had not been completed. In that lawsuit, the trial court concluded a CEQA violation had occurred and invalidated Measure G.

The County also adopted a separate repeal ordinance that stated “Chapter 5.84 of Title 5 of the Kern County Ordinance Code is hereby repealed in its entirety.” Chapter 5.84 was where the 2011 dispensary ban would have been codified and where the predecessor 2009 ordinance, authorizing dispensaries in commercially zoned areas, was set forth. In its request for an Injunction, the County argued that, after Measure G was invalidated and the repeal ordinance was in effect, no ordinance permitted medical marijuana dispensaries to operate within County’s jurisdiction. The trial court granted the preliminary injunction, and the Defendants appealed.

Here, Section 9144 provides that “the ordinance shall be suspended” upon a county’s timely receipt of a protest petition. The court interpreted this phrase to mean that the Dispensary Ban Ordinance was prevented from becoming operative by County’s timely receipt of the valid protest petition. In this case, the board of supervisors reconsidered the protested ordinance as required by section 9144. After its reconsideration, the board chose to repeal the Dispensary Ban Ordinance and repeal the 2009 Ordinance. The parties disputed whether the board’s combined actions satisfied, or exceeded, section 9145’s requirement to “entirely repeal the ordinance.” The court found that this phrase required the board of supervisors to revoke the protested ordinance in all its parts and refrain from additional action that would have the practical effect of implementing the essential feature of the protested ordinance.

The County argued the absence of authorization resulting from the repeal of the 2009 Ordinance was not the same as a dispensary ban even though the Ordinance Code is a “permissive” code under which any uses not specifically permitted are prohibited. The court found that the theoretical possibility the County might authorize dispensaries under its discretionary authority was irrelevant, as the prohibition did not be absolute to have the practical impact of banning dispensaries. Accordingly, the court reversed, holding the repeal of the 2009 Ordinance to be invalid and declaring that ordinance as being in full force and effect.

County of Kern v T.C.E.F., 200 Cal. Rptr. 3d 714 (4/5/2016)

 

Petitioners-plaintiffs owned land in the Town of Greig, situated in a rural residential district. Plaintiffs filed a special permit application seeking permission to install 7,600 feet of underground pipeline for the purpose of transporting water from their property to a “load out” facility in a separate town. Plaintiffs’ intent was to “collect water from the naturally occurring aquifer under their land and to store such water for the purpose of bulk sale.” Initially respondent-defendant, Planning Board of Town of Greig, refused to consider the application, thereby forcing petitioners to commence an initial hybrid CPLR article 78 proceeding and declaratory judgment action. The Supreme Court granted that petition-complaint, in part, by ordering the Planning Board “to consider the application on the merits according to lawful procedure and standards.” However, the court declined to address that part of the first petition seeking affirmative relief on the application.

The Planning Board then granted the special permit, with several conditions, including one that “no construction on the pipeline may commence until the use of wells on the other property of the applicants is approved for commercial uses by the Town of Greig.” Petitioners commenced a second hybrid CPLR article 78 proceeding and declaratory judgment action, by another petition-complaint, seeking to strike that condition from the special permit and a declaration that the Planning Board was without legal authority to regulate the use of water resources or to require petitioners to secure any additional approval with regard to water extraction from their property. The court consolidated the two proceedings/actions, but denied the relief requested in the second petition as well as petitioners’ request for a declaration.

The court found that the Water Resources Law did not preempt the authority of local governments to “regulate the use of land through the enactment of zoning laws.” The court considered the language of the statute, the statutory scheme as a whole, and the legislative history of the Water Resources Law, in reaching its conclusion that the intent of the legislation was to regulate water extraction “for commercial and industrial purposes” in order to preserve and protect the natural resource. Thus, the court held that business could be excluded from residential districts, whose primary purpose is to provide an environment for “safe, healthful and comfortable family life rather than the development of commercial instincts and the pursuit of pecuniary profits.” Additionally, petitioners did not yet obtain permission to use their residential property for a commercial use. Accordingly, the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ second petition was affirmed.

Smoke v Planning Board of Town of Greig, 2016 WL 1710454 (NYAD 4 Dept. 4/29/2016)

Plaintiffs purchased property and attempted to establish a nursery and farm operation thereon. At that time, the Clinton Zoning Regulations did not require a permit or certificate of compliance for a “nursery, truck garden or farm when no building or other structure is to be established in connection therewith.” In 1990, plaintiffs applied for and received Public Act 490 classification as farmland, which included their nursery operation. Over the next several years, plaintiffs used their property both as a nursery and a farm, began to process mulch and firewood for commercial sale, and kept livestock on the property. Effective January, 1, 2012, the Clinton Zoning Regulations were amended: (1) nurseries, truck gardens, farms, and greenhouses were required to be special exception uses in all resident zones; (2) the provision that no zoning permit was required for nurseries, truck gardens or farms was eliminated; and (3) the livestock regulation was revised to read: “All livestock shall be kept in a building, stable or enclosure, not less than the legal setback for the appropriate zone for any abutting residential or Village Zone property and one hundred feet away from any well or water body from which water is taken for human consumption.” Following this, Thomas Lane, the Zoning Enforcement Officer for the Town of Clinton, issued to plaintiffs Orders to Discontinue their farming operations. The Orders explicitly provide that they “may be appealed to the Zoning Board of Appeals of the Town of Clinton within fifteen days of its receipt.” However, rather than appeal, Plaintiffs brought this court action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of their equal protection and substantive due process rights.

Here, Defendants presented evidence that plaintiffs appealed neither the April 16 nor the November 15, 2012 Orders to Discontinue to the Clinton Zoning Board of Appeals, even though the Orders clearly stated that plaintiffs had fifteen days to do so. Furthermore, defendants submitted evidence that plaintiffs failed to allege that they requested either variance relief or a determination that their use of the property constituted a valid nonconforming use. Lastly, because plaintiffs neither pleaded nor presented evidence that such an appeal or variance request would be futile or that the Clinton Zoning Board of Appeals was a remedial body, the court found that the plaintiffs had not met the first prong of Williamson, and their claims were therefore not yet ripe for adjudication and should be dismissed.

Cashman v Lane, 2016 WL 1305106 (D. Conn. 3/31/2016)

 

Plaintiff Nardiello is the owner and sole director and officer of Plaintiff Two By Four, a dog-walking business formed in 2010 and operated out of her home. As her business grew she received violations from the Town for operating a business out of her home. In 2012, Plaintiff Two By Four leased a premises at 34 South Street, Oyster Bay, NY, in an area zoned for light industry. Plaintiff alleged that in retaliation for Plaintiff refusing Commissioner Ippolito’s advances at her prior job, Ippolito said he was “not giving her a permit.” In December 2012, Plaintiff applied for a building permit to erect a one story prefabricated barn and renovate an existing free-standing building on the Premises. Before getting a response on the permit application, Plaintiff erected the structure that was the subject of the application, “with the full expectation” that Ippolito would issue the permit before the building was complete. The Town issued misdemeanor violations against Two By Four for erecting a building without a permit and occupying the building without a certificate of occupancy. In 2014, still without a ruling on Plaintiffs’ application, the Commissioner issued “Notices of Dangerous Conditions” pursuant to his emergency powers, directing that the Premises by “secured, boarded, fenced, sealed or otherwise made safe,” even though no investigations or reports had been made or filed to warrant such a notice. Plaintiffs alleged this was a conspiracy by Ippolito and other Defendant Town officials to shut down or injure Two By Four.

In 2014, Two By Four initiated an Article 78 proceeding in New York Supreme Court in Nassau County to enjoin the Commissioner from exceeding his authority and to compel him to act on Plaintiffs’ application. The court granted a temporary restraining order and directed that an inspection of the Premises be conducted. The inspection was conducted by Defendant Blanchard, who, Plaintiffs alleged, then conspired with the other Defendants to concoct false allegations. In this case Plaintiffs claimed that Defendants violated their due process and equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, violated their First Amendment right to petition, and conspired to preclude Plaintiffs from operating its business in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985.

The court first noted that where, as here there is an adequate state post-deprivation procedure such as an Article 78 proceeding to remedy a random, arbitrary deprivation of property or liberty, there is no constitutional violation (and therefore no § 1983 claim). Thus, regardless of whether there was a property interest that was deprived, the court found that the availability of the Article 78 proceeding defeats Plaintiffs’ procedural due process claim. As to the substantive due process claim, the court found there was no “clear entitlement” to the permit, as the Town had to review and make a compliance and safety determination. Thus, there was no federal protected property right in a state or local permit.

Likewise, Plaintiffs’ equal protection claim failed as it did not allege with sufficient specificity how others were treated, who those others were, or how their treatment varied from the treatment Plaintiffs received. Next, even accepting Plaintiffs’ allegations as true, the claim for violation of the First Amendment right of petition also failed, since the complaint itself alleged that Plaintiffs had court review. Plaintiffs initiated an Article 78 proceeding and were granted temporary restraining order enjoining the Commissioner from acting further on the dangerous building notice until an inspection occurred. Finally, the court found that Plaintiffs failed to adequately allege a claim under § 1985(2), as there was insufficient evidence presented that Defendants intended to deny Plaintiffs “equal protection of the laws” or were motivated by “discriminatory ‘racial, ethnic, or class-based animus.”’

Nardiello v. Town of Oyster Bay, 2016 WL 1464557 (EDNY 4/12/2016)

 

Property owner Schnieder, acting pro se, filed a § 1983 action against Amador County, the county’s code enforcement officer, and the county counsel alleging that county’s enforcement of its outside storage ordinances violated his constitutional rights and state law. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California, dismissed the complaint, and the owner appealed.

Upon review of Schneider’s claims, the court found that the district court properly dismissed Schneider’s equal protection and procedural due process claims as unripe because they were not yet fit for judicial review and the hardship to Schneider was relatively minor. The court also found that the district court properly dismissed Schneider’s First Amendment retaliation claim as barred by the statute of limitations because Schneider filed his action more than two years after his claims accrued and Schneider did not show any basis for equitable estoppel. Next, the court upheld the district court’s dismissal of Schneider’s other First Amendment claims because Schneider failed to allege facts sufficient to show that the ordinances were unconstitutional as applied to him, impermissible restrictions on expressive conduct, or unconstitutionally vague or overbroad.

The court also affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Schneider’s dormant Commerce Clause claim because Schneider failed to allege facts sufficient to show that the ordinances had a significant impact on interstate commerce, and the dismissal of Schneider’s state law claims because Schneider failed to allege facts sufficient to show that he properly exhausted his claims. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Schneider leave to amend because amendment would have been futile.

Schneider v Amador County, 629 Fed. Appx. 788 (9th Cir. CA 10/29/2015)

As its current lease was set to expire in 2014, Plaintiff North Jersey Vineyard Church purchased a property at 310 Phillips Avenue in South Hackensack (the “Phillips Property”). The Phillips Property was zoned for mixed use and did not allow for houses of worship. The Church submitted an application for a variance, which included a traffic impact analysis, a planning report, and an engineer’s report. The Zoning Board of Adjustment unanimously denied the application. The Church then filed suit against the Township, alleging a variety of claims including a facial challenge of the Township’s Zoning Code. The parties reached a settlement in which the Township allegedly agreed to amend the zoning code to allow houses of worship in mixed use districts and agreed that the existing parking lot was sufficient for the building. Based on this settlement, the Church states that it concluded its purchase of the Phillips Property for $3 million.

The Church’s application for site plan approval was heard on August 27, 2015. However, prior to this hearing, the Township Planner informed the Church that, while it met the parking requirements for the sanctuary, it was deficient 116 spaces for non-sanctuary space, since it needed to provide one spot per 200 square feet for such purposes. The Board then voted to deny the Church’s Site Plan, allegedly without providing any information or reason for the denial.

Following the denial, the Church initiated the instant action seeking a reversal of the Township Planning Board’s decision and monetary damages. The Church then filed a motion to serve third-party subpoenas prior to the Rule 26(f) conference, and asked the Court to order the Township to vacate the Township Planning Board’s denial and allow it to use the Phillips Property pending a final adjudication by the court.

The Court found that the Church’s First Amendment freedoms were not chilled, since the Church continued to have use of the Teterboro Property to conduct its religious services. Additionally, the parking issue did not directly penalize the Church’s First Amendment right, but instead only incidentally inhibited it. As such, the court found that the Church’s cursory assertions of a chilling effect on its right to worship failed to show irreparable harm to justify the relief sought. Moreover, a party seeking injunctive relief must show not only irreparable injury, but that such harm is immediate, rather than a remote or speculative possibility. Here, because the Township Resolution calling for a preliminary investigation failed to amount to an imminent or presently existing threat necessitating injunctive relief, the court found that the Church had not established harm to its property rights sufficient to warrant a preliminary injunction. Finally, as the church never occupied the Phillips Property, this was not an attempt to maintain the status quo, but rather change it by way of an order from the court. As such, the Church’s motion for a preliminary injunction was denied.

North Jersey Vineyard Church v Town of South Hackensack, 2016 WL 1365997 (D NJ 4/6/2016)

Plaintiff, a resident of Memphis, Tennessee, who attended a Memphis City Council public meeting, which was a “remand hearing,” during which Plaintiff sought to overturn the rejection of his plan for re-subdivision of a lot he owned in the Belle Meade Subdivision. The plan had been rejected by the Land Use Control Board (“LUCB”), an agent of both the City and of Shelby County. Plaintiff asserted that he had filed his application for re-subdivision in 2011 during the effective period of the original version of the Unified Development Code (“UDC”). The UDC was later amended several times through amendments adopted by the City Council and Shelby County Board of Commissioners. Plaintiff alleged that the Defendants did not apply ZTA 14-001, the then-applicable zoning law, or any amendments to the UDC, when denying his application, and that Defendants violated his due process rights by enacting ZTA 15-001, which was initiated by the City Council and drafted by Josh Whitehead, director of planning for the Office of Planning and Development (“OPD”), under the direction of Allan Wade, counsel for the City Council.

ZTA 15-001 amended UDC Section 9.7.7H to read that the Section “only applies to proposed subdivisions within the City of Memphis and that the LUCB or City Council may reject a preliminary plan if…the subdivision is not in keeping with the character…in the neighborhood.” Plaintiff alleged that ZTA 15-001 was not enacted in accordance with the UDC 9.3.3 Application Requirements, which required that an application for the amendment be submitted at least thirty-five days before the LUCB could consider it. Moreover, Plaintiff alleged that there was not adequate public notice of the hearing to consider the amendment and that a staff report was published on April 30, 2015, stating that the amendment resolution had been passed on May 5, 2015, which suggested that, in violation of the Open Meetings Act, advance notice had been given to Whitehead that the resolution would pass. As of the date the court decided this case, Plaintiff no longer owned the property he sought to subdivide, since he sold his entire interest on October 16, 2015. In this case, the court reviewed Defendant Shelby County Government’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint and Defendants City of Memphis and Memphis City Council’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint.

At the outset, the court granted Shelby County’s motion to dismiss, given the lack of involvement of Shelby County in the consideration and subsequent enactment of ZTA 15-001. However, the court determined that the City Defendants were not immune from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because plaintiff plausibly alleged a pattern of conformance, as prior years’ amendments were enacted following a particular procedure that was not utilized when enacting the 2015 amendment. Despite this, Plaintiff’s substantive and procedural due process claims were dismissed. Plaintiff failed to assert a protected property interest because he did allege that he was deprived of economically viable use of his property, but rather only that he was denied the right to subdivide it. Furthermore, while Plaintiff did sufficiently allege a protected liberty interest, this claim failed because he did not allege facts to support that his liberty interest was denied with “extreme irrationality,” or that he had been denied notice and an opportunity to be heard.

The court next found that the City of Memphis did not violate Plaintiff’s equal protection rights because similarly-situated individuals, those seeking to subdivide properties within the City of Memphis, were treated no differently under ZTA 15-001. Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim also failed because Plaintiff had not asserted membership in any class that was the basis of discriminatory animus by any alleged conspirator, and because employees of an entity cannot conspire among themselves because they are treated as one entity. Finally, the court granted dismissal of Plaintiff’s Open Meetings Act claim, as notice of the meeting was given in the Daily News, and there was no allegation that the proceedings were conducted in secret. Moreover, the court found that failing to specify the content discussed did not make the notice inadequate, in light of the multiple purposes of the meeting.

Wills v Memphis, 2016 WL 1651878 (WD TN 4/25/2016)

Property owner Itama Development Associates, L.P., appealed from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County (trial court) denying the consolidated land use appeals of Itama and its tenant, Minuteman Environmental Services, Inc. The School District used the subject garage for storage, fueling, parking and routine maintenance of its school buses and vehicle fleet. These uses continued even after the school building was demolished. Kenneth Lee, an inspector from the Department of Environmental Protection, testified that he visited the Property on five occasions from July to September 2014. He observed roll-off containers, some containing residual waste from drilling activities; empty frac tanks; and other equipment. Lee also observed employees erecting a containment area upon which emptied frac tanks would be placed. On his last two visits, Lee observed a disabled truck parked on the Property that was loaded with residual drill cuttings. Because of this, the trial court affirmed the Rostraver Township Zoning Hearing Board’s order directing Minuteman to cease and desist commercial trucking activities on Itama’s property.

Itama first argued that the Zoning Board’s approval of its occupancy permit at the June 11, 2014, hearing established the law of the case with respect to the lawful nonconforming uses. Specifically, Itama contended that, contrary to the Board’s findings and conclusions in its November 21, 2014, decision, the Board did not limit Itama’s occupancy permit to “diesel fueling and minor maintenance,” nor did it hold that the School District had abandoned its use of the Property for parking vehicles. The court found that the law of the case doctrine is inapplicable here, since the law of the case doctrine applies to rulings within the same case, not to rulings in two separate cases in which the Zoning Board’s holdings are inconsistent. Likewise, Itama’s res judicata argument also failed, as the record did not indicate that the Zoning Board’s first decision expressly approved the parking and storage of vehicles for all time so that the Board was estopped from considering in the second proceeding whether such uses had been abandoned.

The Zoning Board found that the School District abandoned its use of the Property for parking buses and other vehicles in June 2009, more than 12 months before Itama purchased the Property in 2013. However, Itama presented uncontroverted evidence that the School District continued to use the Property through July 2013 for maintaining and fueling its vehicles, activities that necessarily include parking. Therefore, the court found these activities were ongoing less than nine months before Itama applied for its occupancy permit.

Itama’s final assignment of error was that the Zoning Board erred in determining that Minuteman’s use of the Property constituted a change in the prior legal nonconforming use, in violation of Section 195–87 of the Zoning Ordinance. During the relevant time period from 2009 through 2013, the School District used the Property as a vehicle garage for fueling, maintaining and dispatching its buses and vehicles. Thus, the Board erred in concluding that the parking of vehicles for any duration was not ancillary to the School District’s operation of a vehicle garage. Moreover, the Board approved Itama’s application to continue the nonconforming use of the Property as a vehicle garage without limitation, and with full knowledge that Itama’s proposed tenant would essentially be running a trucking operation 12 months a year. Accordingly, the court found that the incidental storage of roll-off boxes and other containers was an increase in the intensity of the prior use, but was not sufficiently dissimilar to the School District’s vehicle garage as to constitute an impermissible expansion of the prior nonconforming use. The trial court’s holding was therefore reversed.

Itama Development Associates, LP v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of the Township of Rostraver, 132 A.3d 1040 (PA Commwlth 1/7/2016)

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