Posted by: Patricia Salkin | August 13, 2019

PA Appeals Court Holds Zoning Ordinance Committee Formed by Township was a Valid Planning Agency

This post was authored by Matthew Loeser, Esq.

Since 2005, the Township and Turbotville Borough participated as a joint planning commission for zoning and land use planning. In 2013, the Board notified Turbotville that it would withdraw from the Joint Commission effective January 1, 2015. The Board subsequently hired consultant KPI Engineering (“KPI”) to draft a new zoning ordinance exclusively for the Township. The Township then formed the Zoning Ordinance Committee (“ZOC”), which consisted of Board members, Joint Commission members and Township residents, to provide KPI input during the proposed ordinance drafting process. ZOC met several times in early-to mid-2014 to review KPI’s proposed ordinance, which KPI eventually presented to the Board. The Board adopted the Ordinance, and James Yannaccone filed a complaint in the trial court against the Board requesting that the Ordinance be declared void. In this case, Yannaccone appealled from the Northumberland County Common Pleas Court’s order declaring the Lewis Township Board of Supervisors’ Ordinance No. 2014-7 valid and in full force and effect.

On appeal, Yannaccone first contended that the trial court erred by recognizing ZOC as a valid planning agency. While Section 201 of the MPC set forth that planning commissions and/or planning departments shall be created “by ordinance,” it was silent with respect to planning committees. Section 201 of the MPC only stated that the Board “shall enlist a planning committee to prepare a proposed ordinance for the Board’s review and adoption”. The record also reflected that ZOC was made up of 10 people: the three Board members, Joint Commission members, and Township residents. Although Section 202 of the MPC set forth that planning commissions “shall have not … more than nine members,” the court found that the MPC did not similarly limit planning committees.

Yannaccone next claimed that the trial court erred by holding that the Board’s monthly meetings strictly complied with the requirement in Section 607(b) of the MPC that “the planning agency shall hold at least one public meeting pursuant to public notice”. The trial court held that the Board substantially complied with the statutory requirements and the public was given the opportunity to participate, as the Board advertised and conducted its monthly public meetings at which ZOC was discussed, at least one ZOC meeting was announced at an open Board meeting, and the Board’s meeting minutes were available to the public. Despite that the Board complied with the notice and hearing requirements of Section 608 of the MPC, however, Section 607(b) of the MPC explicitly stated that “the planning agency” is the entity mandated by Section 607(b) of the MPC to hold at least one public meeting after public notice. While the record before the trial court established that ZOC meetings were public, they were neither published in a newspaper of general circulation nor posted as Section 703 of the Sunshine Act mandated. Since none of ZOC’s meetings took place after “public notice,” the court held that the Board did not substantially comply with Section 607(b) of the MPC, and the trial court erred by finding otherwise. Furthermore, the Board’s failure to issue public notice of at least one of ZOC’s public meetings was found to be a fatal flaw that invalidated the Ordinance’s enactment and rendered it void from inception.        

Lastly, since this case involved an ordinance validity challenge brought in accordance with Section 1002-A(b) of the MPC, rather than a land use appeal filed pursuant to Section 1002-A(a) of the MPC, the court found that Section 1002.1-A of the MPC was inapplicable. Moreover, the court held that even had this matter involved a land use appeal, because Yannaccone filed his validity challenge within 30 days, the strict compliance standards in Section 1002.1-A(d)(1) of the MPC would apply, rather than the sufficient notice and direct affect provisions in Section 1002.1-A(d)(1) of the MPC. Accordingly, the trial court erred by relying on Section 1002.1-A of the MPC in reaching its conclusion.

Yannaccone v. Lewis Township Board of Supervisors, 2019 WL 3755213 (PA Cmmwlth 8/9/2019)


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